Since the Autonomous Administration announced its readiness to hold local elections in the areas under its control, Turkish threats targeting its project have continued unabated. Turkey views the elections as a means of consolidating the governance structures of the administration in a way that makes it difficult to undermine them in the future. Concurrently, Turkey’s rapprochement with the Assad regime has witnessed significant developments[1], with Moscow making strenuous efforts to accelerate the rapprochement between the two sides and sponsoring a bilateral meeting at the presidential level between Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad. This is in preparation for the post-US election period, the possibility of Trump’s return to power, and its repercussions for the region. This is in addition to regional concerns related to the outbreak of a new war in Lebanon and its spillover effects into the Syrian arena.
The atmosphere of this rapprochement has raised concerns within the administration, which considers it an “existential threat” and describes it as a “major conspiracy against the Syrian people.”[2] This situation assessment examines Turkey’s motives for rapprochement with the Assad regime and the expected scenarios for how the Autonomous Administration will deal with the new reality.
A Strategic or Tactical Shift in Turkey
Turkish policy toward Syria has undergone numerous transformations since 2011, influenced by local, regional, and international variables. These shifts ranged from support for democratic transition to a security-military strategy focused on protecting its borders and combating “terrorism” through direct military intervention and support for the Syrian National Army.
After the Syrian issue entered a state of political deadlock and the freezing of the conflict, which led to the establishment of security borders separating areas of control, the burden on Turkey increased in terms of the continued presence of millions of refugees on its territory, the continued security threat on its borders, and the existence of security agreements with the United States and Russia that hinder any new military action. In this context, Turkish attempts to reach a rapprochement with the Assad regime, with Russian support, are seeking alternative paths to achieve Turkey’s interests and preserve its national security.
Turkish enthusiasm for rapprochement with the regime can be understood in two main dimensions. The first is related to regional and international developments and is manifested in three main motives:
Trump’s Return to Power: Turkey aspires to restore closer and more friendly relations with the United States under a new Trump administration, based on private understandings between the two presidents on several regional issues during Trump’s previous presidency. Ankara expects Trump’s foreign policies to be more aligned with its interests, including the possibility of reconsidering the presence of US forces in Syria, managing relations with Russia, and dealing with the SDF. Therefore, Turkey is seeking rapprochement with the Assad regime in preparation for any changes that may come with Trump’s return.
Improving Relations with Moscow: Amid tensions with the West, Turkey views its relations with Russia as a strategy that strengthens its international standing and expands its margin of maneuver on numerous regional and international issues. This rapprochement with the Assad regime, supported by Moscow, is part of Ankara’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with Russia, secure its interests, and assert its independent decision-making on regional issues.
Fear of the War in Gaza Evolving into a Regional War: Turkey fears that the ongoing Gaza war and the escalating military operations in Lebanon could lead to a comprehensive regional war that could spill over into Syria. In this context, rapprochement with Damascus and strengthening relations with Moscow are a strategic step to coordinate regional efforts and ensure the protection of its interests and national security should the situation deteriorate.
The second dimension is linked to the dynamics of Turkish politics, taking into account that the issues on the table are complex and beyond the capabilities of both sides. The interests of local, regional, and international actors in Syria are intertwined, and it is not easy to discuss many issues between Turkey and the Assad regime in isolation from other actors. Here, Turkish motives can be identified by four main priorities:
Legalizing the Turkish military presence in Syria: Turkey seeks to ensure the continuation of the “fight against terrorism” until the “autonomous administration” project is eliminated. Given the loss of trust in the Assad regime and the United States, it seeks to keep its troops on the ground to secure its borders and national security. In the medium and long term, Turkey needs to legitimize this presence from the ruling political regime in Syria, through a new agreement that gives it the right to fight “terrorism” inside Syria or an amendment to the Adana Agreement. However, it is unlikely that the regime will accept the legitimacy of the Turkish presence without sufficient guarantees for withdrawal and gains on other issues. Blocking any future presence of the autonomous administration at the decision-making table in Damascus: Turkey fears political arrangements that could lead to constitutional legitimacy for the “autonomous administration” and the rise of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to decision-making circles within the future political system in Damascus. This would further complicate the issue and threaten the future of relations between Turkey and Syria.
Easing the burden of refugees: Turkey hosts more than 5 million Syrian refugees on its territory and oversees the management of services for nearly 5 million displaced persons and residents in northwestern Syria. In recent years, Syrian refugees have been blamed—by some Turkish political parties—for the severe economic crisis the country is experiencing. As a result of political polarization, the refugee issue has been thrust into the realm of domestic political conflict, affecting the mood of the Turkish voter. This was reflected in the results of the recent local elections, which resulted in the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) losing its most important strongholds in major cities and Anatolian regions.[3] The return of Syrian refugees has become a top priority for the government, as Turkey seeks to repatriate a large percentage of refugees with “Russian guarantees” that they will not be subjected to security persecution by regime forces.
Dispersing the Syrian Democratic Forces: Given the difficulty of carrying out new military operations, Turkey is seeking to push the regime to play a greater role in eastern Syria with the help of Arab tribes. This is to end the SDF’s control over the region and disperse its military and economic power by depriving it of access to oil and gas resources. Turkey believes that a significant portion of the revenues from these resources reach the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and are used to finance its conflict with the Turkish state.
The Autonomous Administration’s Concerns and Available Options
There is no doubt that the path of Turkish rapprochement with the regime is long-term and may take a long time to achieve the desired results for both parties. However, the Autonomous Administration no longer has the luxury of maneuvering among regional and international actors. It realizes that the shift in Turkish policy is strategic, not tactical, and that this rapprochement will reduce its available options and present it with difficult challenges, especially since it will block any future agreement between it and the regime. If the new US administration decides to withdraw its forces completely or partially from eastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration will face a real threat to its future presence on the map of local Syrian actors.
The expected scenarios for how the administration will deal with the new developments range from the following three:
The first scenario: Making concessions to the regime and concluding a new agreement with it. Moscow may be a guarantor of such an agreement if it leads to a reduction in the area of US forces deployed in Syria, such that the SDF withdraws its military presence from the northern cities to a depth of 30 km, while maintaining a presence in the areas adjacent to the main US bases. In addition to the regime’s return to administrative and security control of city centers, and the integration of the autonomous administration’s civilian administrative structures with the regime’s governing institutions, this scenario is considered the most likely if Turkey’s rapprochement with the regime advances, and given the continued US presence, which prevents any attempt to completely end the SDF experience by military means. However, there are many obstacles that limit the possibility of implementing this scenario.
The second scenario: The autonomous administration’s openness to Turkey under US sponsorship, preceded by a genuine reconciliation with local actors in northeastern Syria, and confidence-building measures that may include: implementing the Manbij agreement as a first step by the SDF, withdrawing its military forces from the border strip, and agreeing on a new governance system in the region supervised by the United States, Turkey, and Russia. The Asayish internal security forces may play a role in ensuring public security in the region. The levers for this scenario lie in the regime’s inability to meet Turkish demands, while Turkey seeks to improve its relations with the United States. This is in addition to a broad belief within the Autonomous Administration that hostility toward Turkey is unrealistic and that it needs to make significant concessions for fear of a sudden US withdrawal, which could confuse all actors and leave it among the biggest losers. Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration’s behavior in recent years and Turkey’s lack of enthusiasm for new engagements with non-state actors may be obstacles to this scenario.
Third Scenario: The SDF entrenches its positions, refuses to make any concessions, and relies on continued US support. It also faces the possibility of carrying out security operations against Turkey in cooperation with local groups in northwestern Syria that reject the Turkish rapprochement with the regime. The danger of this scenario for the administration lies in the fact that it could lead to the outbreak of new battles and the lifting of Russian protection from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the Tal Rifaat and Kobani areas. This would mean a loss of control over new areas and a Turkish advance there. This could also lead to the possibility of reaching a joint understanding between Türkiye and the regime to address the northeastern Syria issue in the medium and long term. In conclusion, it is unlikely that the rapprochement between Turkey and the Assad regime will reach advanced levels. However, the new path Turkey has embarked on in its engagement with the Syrian issue will have significant repercussions for the broader landscape and for the future of the “Autonomous Administration” in northeastern Syria in particular. The administration is aware that Turkish normalization with the regime will reduce its chances of remaining a local Syrian actor and will block any future agreement with the regime, especially if Donald Trump returns to power in the United States and seeks to improve relations with Turkey and Russia and potentially withdraw his forces completely or partially from Syria.
