Summary
This report reviews the repercussions of the most important political, security, and economic events in Syria during July 2024. Politically, the process of regional and international normalization with the Assad regime has progressed, represented by the appointment of an Italian ambassador to Damascus, the submission of a “no paper” by seven countries to the European Union Council demanding the abandonment of the “three no’s,” and the regime’s willingness to build a new relationship with Turkey. Security-wise, signs of instability are escalating across Syria. In northwestern Syria, the wave of popular protests has been accompanied by violence and direct confrontations with Turkish forces following the events in Kayseri. The region also witnessed the largest drone attack launched by regime forces in 2024 against civilian sites in the Aleppo and Idlib countrysides. In eastern Syria, the international coalition is seeking to strengthen its deployment points amid escalating attacks by Iranian-backed militias on the region. Economically, exports through the Nassib border crossing have continued to decline, and the regime’s economic policies have led to increased capital flight, coinciding with the rising cost of living. Meanwhile, the “Autonomous Administration” has pursued economic policies that have harmed the agricultural sector.
The Implications of Regional and International Normalization for Local Actors
In the context of normalization and the restoration of relations with Bashar al-Assad, Italy announced the reinstatement of its diplomatic mission and the appointment of an ambassador to Damascus. This step coincided with a call by Italy and six other European Union member states to abandon the “three no’s” that define the EU’s position on the Syrian issue ([1]). In response, the regime’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement in response to Turkish calls to restore relations with Damascus. The statement expressed the regime’s willingness to build a new relationship with Turkey based on “clear foundations,” the most important of which are: the withdrawal of illegally present forces from Syrian territory, the fight against “terrorist groups” that threaten the security of both countries, and linking the return of normal relations between the two countries to a return to the status quo prevalent before 2011. The statement demonstrates the regime’s acceptance of the start of the normalization process, its response to Turkish calls, and its abandonment of the precondition of the withdrawal of Turkish forces before a meeting between Erdoğan and Assad.
The regional and international normalization process with the Assad regime is proceeding steadily, despite the differing motives of countries, which are predominantly security-related or experimenting with alternative solutions under the pretext of providing incentives to the regime, based on a step-by-step approach “with the aim of gradually changing its behavior.” However, the normalization process is proceeding in accordance with the regime’s preferences and interests. Bilateral agreements give it greater room for maneuver, given that they are based on the interests of each individual country. They also enable it to evade political obligations and implement international resolutions, most notably 2245.
On the domestic front, the Assad regime held its fourth legislative elections since the adoption of the new constitution in 2012, following years of stagnation that had dominated the Syrian scene since the cessation of military operations under the terms of the de-escalation agreements. These elections came shortly after the Baath Party elections, which demonstrated Assad’s efforts to reengineer the party’s power centers and consolidate his absolute control, with the aim of making it a political force aligned with Assad’s compass and orientations, capable of “interacting and leading” any new political landscape. The regime’s insistence on holding elections aims to project an image of “steadfastness and victory despite international conspiracies and pressure,” in addition to evading a political solution by claiming to strengthen its popular legitimacy through “elections.” Western countries consider the environment unfavorable for holding elections, while official opposition groups demand genuine democratic elections in accordance with international resolutions representing all segments of the population, unlike the current council. Popular and media campaigns have also been launched rejecting these ostensible elections.
In northeastern Syria, the atmosphere of Turkish rapprochement with the Assad regime has raised concerns within the “Autonomous Administration,” which considers it an “existential threat” and describes this course as a “major conspiracy against the Syrian people.” The administration realizes that the shift in Turkish policy is strategic, not tactical, and that this rapprochement will reduce its available options and confront it with difficult challenges, especially since—if successful—it will block any future agreement between it and the regime. This explains the statement by Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, who emphasized the impossibility of resolving the Syrian crisis through violence, war, and fighting. He affirmed the administration’s readiness to engage in dialogue with all parties and forces, including Turkey, to halt the fighting and reach a political solution in Syria. To ease local tensions, the administration issued a general amnesty law in response to the demands of residents, tribal sheikhs, and dignitaries. The amnesty includes hundreds of prisoners convicted of terrorism offenses and all crimes committed prior to the amnesty.
Escalating Security Tensions: Popular Protests Increase Instability
Northwestern Syria has witnessed protests, including vandalism of public and private property, including the burning of trucks, the lowering of Turkish flags, and direct clashes with Turkish forces in several locations. This followed the vandalism and attacks on Syrian refugees in the Turkish province of Kayseri, on the one hand, and a rejection of renewed talk of political normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime following statements by Turkish politicians about rapprochement, which sparked the protests, on the other. There are also other dimensions that have prompted a number of residents of these areas to express a high level of anger and resentment, due to the ongoing accumulation of a long period of neglect of good governance issues, widespread corruption, the fragility of security, the imbalance in civil-security relations, and the absence of clear boundaries surrounding the nature of the relationship with Türkiye.
On the other hand, the Idlib region witnessed a military escalation between regime forces and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The regime launched its largest drone attack in 2024 against civilian sites in the Aleppo and Idlib countrysides, while HTS continued to carry out infiltration operations against regime forces, the most prominent of which occurred in the Saraqib axis at the beginning of July.
On a different note, the settlement model remains characterized by security fragility in various areas. In the town of Kanaker, following the regime’s imposition of a new security settlement aimed at integrating draft-dodgers into army units, opponents of the settlement attacked a regime headquarters. The settlement and the events that accompanied it came weeks after clashes between regime forces and local militants at the beginning of the previous month. In Sweida, Marhej al-Jarmani, the commander of the Liwa al-Jabal faction, was assassinated. He was known for his support for the popular movement in the province and his responsibility for protecting demonstrations there. This assassination is considered the most prominent in the province since the beginning of the movement, and it occurred shortly after the regime brought in security reinforcements to the province. In Daraa, clashes between two local groups continued for more than ten days in the city of Jassem in the Daraa countryside, following the assassination of a leader in one group and accusations against the other of being behind the operation. Also in the same governorate, fighters launched multiple attacks targeting various regime forces’ positions, coinciding with roadblocks with burning tires. This was in response to the kidnapping of a family from the al-Sanamayn area by a gang affiliated with the Fourth Division in the Homs countryside. The attacks ceased after the family’s release. Meanwhile, 60 people, most of them civilians, were killed in areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration as a result of security disturbances, murders, and tribal clashes, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. ISIS operations continued in areas under the administration’s control, with 21 different security operations taking place, ranging from shootings, killings with sharp objects, to planting explosive devices and landmines, resulting in six deaths. Meanwhile, the US base at the Conoco gas plant in the Deir Ezzor countryside was subjected to a missile attack launched by Iranian militias. US aircraft responded by targeting the vicinity of seven villages within the areas of influence of pro-Iranian militias in the Deir Ezzor countryside with heavy machine guns. New military reinforcements for coalition forces also arrived in the area, including an Avenger short-range air defense system. The international coalition has begun establishing observation towers along the Euphrates River in the eastern Deir Ezzor countryside to monitor the area and control the security situation amid increasing attacks by tribal forces from the opposite bank on SDF positions and fears of an Iranian escalation against the US presence in the region.
