Introduction
Civil society is considered the third sector alongside the state and the private sector. It encompasses various forms of organizations and formations whose roles vary from one country to another depending on the environment in which they operate. Generally speaking, the concept of civil society is linked to four basic concepts: the ability to self-organize, represent community interests, and provide services for the public good, including deliberations on issues of public concern. ([1]) Historically, Syria has known several forms of civil society organizations, which were framed by successive ruling authorities with laws that reflected their philosophy and outlook on civil work. These organizations were often characterized by suspicion and mistrust, necessitating control and domination of civil society organizations. This philosophy was particularly reflected in the infamous Law No. 93 of 1958 on Private Associations and Institutions, which successive governments used as a tool to control associations, supplemented by more restrictive amendments and executive regulations, and reinforced by a package of laws restricting public freedoms. The approach to associations also restricted them to charitable, humanitarian, and service-related activities, while ensuring their exclusion from development, human rights, and political spheres through restrictions, coercion, or threats. The role of civil society organizations grew during the Syrian revolution, due to the decline in central state control and the enormous need for external support. With the formation of areas of influence administered by de facto authorities, civil society lacked a unified regulatory framework.
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the new authorities had to balance the need for a state presence to regulate and supervise civil society work, on the one hand, and the need to grant organizations the freedom to operate to attract donors and meet needs, on the other. This resulted in a hybrid approach based on harmonizing the Salvation Government’s experience in managing civil society organizations with the regulatory and legal frameworks governing associations and institutions accredited by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in Damascus. This approach has created emerging spaces for civil society organizations, supported by the new government’s flexibility and cautious openness to civil society organizations. However, it has also raised concerns among organizations about legal and regulatory loopholes that could be exploited to re-establish state control over associations. This is particularly true given the retention of Law No. 93 of 1958 and the absence of serious official deliberations to date regarding the drafting of a new civil society organization law. Based on the importance of overcoming the legacy of the past, overcoming existing loopholes, and strengthening emerging spaces and available opportunities, this paper examines the trajectory of civil society work before and after the fall of Assad, leading to proposed policies and steps that would create an enabling environment for civil society work in Syria.
Civil Society Work Before the Fall of Assad: Survival Despite Restrictions
The laws regulating the work of civil society organizations in Syria reflected the ruling authorities’ philosophy regarding civil society work. The relationship between successive authorities and organizations was often tense, as the latter were viewed as a potential threat to the unity of the state and its ruling regime, given their political potential and the potential for external exploitation. This necessitated state oversight (the Ottoman Law of Associations of 1909), or as a threat to the hegemony of the ruling authority, given their representative capacity to mobilize and mobilize. Therefore, the authorities were forced to resort to excessive interference in the management of organizations, impose arbitrary supervision over them, and strip them of any representative dimension by restricting them to charitable/service-oriented activities under the label of civil society work.
This trend prevailed during the era of the Syrian-Egyptian union (Law No. 93 of 1958 on Private Associations and Institutions) and later during the Baath era under Hafez al-Assad, where Law No. 93 was maintained as a tool for controlling organizations and reinforced with more restrictive amendments and executive regulations, in addition to strengthening it with a series of measures and laws to enforce central control over the civil sphere, such as establishing civil organizations linked to the Baath, and controlling unions. At the beginning of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, civil society organizations’ room for maneuver expanded despite the continued validity of Law No. 93. This was due to the requirements of partnership with the European Union ([2]) and the regime’s need to fill gaps arising from the gradual decline of the state’s social policies. This was in addition to appeasing Syrians by opening up civil society ([3]) and using it in a public relations campaign to promote the regime. It also sought to attract foreign funding under the guise of development and civil society work, as evidenced by the establishment of the Syria Trust for Development in 2007. The regime demonstrated flexibility within what Stephen Heydemann describes as authoritarian modernization as a strategy to absorb crises without fundamental changes in the regime’s structure. This explains the boom in associations between 2005 and 2010, with the number of licensed associations increasing from 650 to 1,485 ([4]), most of which were charitable and humanitarian organizations. With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the role and importance of civil society organizations increased due to the decline in the control of central state institutions and their limited role in providing services, coinciding with the increased level of need. This was also accompanied by increased support provided to organizations by donors. Generally, civil society work during the revolution was characterized by a multiplicity of regulatory frameworks, weak accountability standards, and attempts by the de facto authorities to tighten their control over the civil society environment. The Assad regime maintained the legal framework governing associations (Law No. 93) and introduced regulatory mechanisms to strengthen the dominance of organizations supported by and linked to the presidential palace over humanitarian and civil society work. This was done in order to maintain patronage networks and support loyalist incubators, as well as to monopolize donor support as much as possible, given the decline in state resources. Furthermore, organizations in areas outside the regime’s control were not spared interference by the de facto authorities, through their security and governance tools, given the resources they represent and the potential threat they pose. Civil Society After Assad: Windows and Walls
The Assad regime fell in December 2024 as a result of Operation Deterrence of Aggression. Subsequently, the Idlib Salvation Government assumed control of state institutions until the formation of a transitional government, which came into being in March 2025. In managing civil society organizations, the new authority had to balance the need for the state to regulate and supervise civil society work, on the one hand, and the need to grant organizations scope to operate in order to attract donors and meet needs, on the other. This resulted in a hybrid approach based on harmonizing Idlib’s experience in managing civil society organizations with the regulatory and legal frameworks governing associations and institutions accredited by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in Damascus ([5]), and the resulting local amendments. ([6]) This approach had an impact on the civil society work environment in the post-Assad period. Its most prominent features can be summarized as follows:
The tendency toward central control over civil society work: The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor took a series of decisions and measures that were interpreted as an attempt to impose central control over civil society work, contrary to its commitment to ensuring a safe working environment. And the legality of the work of organizations and associations and the removal of obstacles to their work. ([7]) This is evident firstly in the maintenance of the infamous Law 93 of 1958, as it gives the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor broad powers to monitor and restrict the movement of organizations, dissolve them, and control their funds. Secondly, obligating NGOs to use standardized forms, including internal regulations, as stipulated in Resolution No. 5201 of December 29, 2024, in a move that some associations considered a violation of the Associations Law. ([8]) The Ministry responded that the move was legal and consistent with Article 30 of Executive Regulations No. 1330 of Associations Law No. 93. Thirdly, issuing Circular No. 28 of February 20, 2025 from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, as well as Circular No. 2391 issued by the Directorate of Social Affairs and Labor in Damascus, which stipulate that international organizations, UN agencies, international organizations, Arab federations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not be addressed or communicated with except through the Directorate of Planning and International Cooperation in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. This move sparked criticism from workers in civil society organizations, which forced the Ministry to clarify in a statement issued on March 18, 2025, that associations and NGOs are not concerned with this circular. ([9])
Existing flexibility and available spaces: The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor announced in its report on its achievements for the period extending from December 2024 to February 2025, that it received 817 applications for licensing non-governmental organizations, 586 of which were licensed in accordance with the established and effective procedures, at a rate of 7 organizations per day. The Ministry is currently demonstrating remarkable flexibility in the process of licensing non-governmental organizations, as evidenced by: ([10]) 1) The cooperation of Ministry employees with organizations during the licensing process, in addition to granting conditional licenses and time limits to those that faced difficulties in obtaining the required documents, allowing them to operate until their paperwork was finally completed. This flexibility is due to difficulties in obtaining certain documents, such as a non-conviction certificate for members and a notification of opening a bank account. 2) Organizations were not exposed to security challenges or excessive scrutiny during the evaluation of establishment applications, and even those that required special security scrutiny (registering the rental of organizations’ headquarters) were not that difficult unless they had potential links to the former Assad regime or were affiliated with it. 3) The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor’s statement No. 965 included aspects that indicate its flexibility in managing the NGO file, such as: Allowing them to operate within three main sectors, increasing their objectives beyond four, and enabling them to operate across all Syrian territory, in addition to being open to proposals submitted and responding to inquiries raised about the mechanism of work of non-governmental organizations. ([11])
Overlapping powers and roles: The alignment between the Idlib experience and the institutional experience and legal frameworks in Damascus has led to a lack of clarity in the regulatory environment for civil society work, with multiple roles and centers. The management of non-governmental organizations is not limited to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, but is also shared by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action (HAC) ([12]), whose institutional affiliation is not precisely known, with some believing it to be a newly formed part of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and others believing it to be an independent institution operating as a parallel structure to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. Likewise, organizations cannot bypass the role of service ministries such as health and education during their work, as can be seen in the text of Resolution 5201 regulating the procedures for licensing non-governmental organizations (NGOs). ([13]) In practice, it becomes clear that there is a role for local structures, especially the regional administration ([14]), in coordinating the work of organizations in the field and supervising their activities, ([15]) and being a central entry point for organizations in assessing the needs of local communities. ([16]) The multiplicity of centers has led to confusion for NGOs. While the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor is seen as flexible and deals with issues of registering organizations and providing guidance and regulatory procedures with ease, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action is seen as more stringent and its working mechanisms unclear, as it assumes responsibility for direct supervision, coordination, and requiring prior approvals for activities to be implemented. ([17]) It also determines the rules governing the work of international and local NGOs. ([18])
Mutual concerns and proposed alternatives: Towards an enabling environment for civil work
for both civil society workers and the administration The new developments have mutual concerns regarding each other. Organizations fear gaps in the legal and regulatory frameworks governing their work, restricting their movement and the space for civil society work, while the authorities have security concerns regarding the role and relations of organizations abroad. These mutual concerns can be addressed through dialogue and principles governing a complementary relationship between the two parties.
A state of anticipation and uncertainty prevails among civil society organizations regarding the transitional government’s new direction following the expiration of the temporary six-month licensing period granted to them pursuant to Resolution No. 5201. Furthermore, the continuity of their work is linked to obtaining a permanent license, which is subject to an evaluation process with unclear features, including mechanisms, criteria, and the responsible authority. This reinforces their fears that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor may resort to dissolving many organizations or merging them with other organizations, by virtue of its powers under Law No. 93. There are also concerns that the six-month period is unfair for evaluating the work of organizations in the post-Assad context. There is also concern about the legal and administrative competence of the cadres responsible for managing and organizing civil society organizations, which impacts the evaluation of organizations and opens the door to possible corruption and abuse when the authority granted to cadres is used in the evaluation process. The organizations’ concerns are reinforced by the broad powers granted by Law No. 93 of 1958 to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, framed in general terms as “serious violations,” to dissolve and merge associations and seize their financial assets. ([19]) These concerns are complemented by the central role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action (HAC) in supervising and monitoring local and international NGOs, in a manner that goes beyond the basic functions of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, as well as in its working mechanisms, structure, and undefined powers.
