Executive Summary
• By announcing the Social Contract, its amendments, and the Political Parties Law, the SDF is attempting to gain legal cover for the de facto authority it imposes by force on the residents of North and East Syria. However, these texts suffer from legal, structural, and implementation problems that undermine their value, given the clear intellectual, political, and security dominance of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) cadres.
• The map of political actors indicates that most of their movements are moving in two directions: either accepting membership in the Autonomous Administration and accepting the leadership and dominance of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), replicating the Ba’ath Party’s experience in Syria through the National Progressive Front, while acquiring some marginal roles, or being classified as an opposition group and subject to restrictions and blockades.
• The decision-making mechanism and political stance within the administration are subject to balances imposed by the agendas and dictates of the PYD leadership, which is organically influenced by the determinants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While acknowledging the presence of some internal and external influences on these decisions, it is also acknowledged that these decisions are influenced by some internal and external factors. • The Autonomous Administration’s determinants of rapprochement with the regime stem from the need to achieve gains that legitimize its de facto authority and to explore other options to confront Turkish threats. It also opens up to some opposition factions in an attempt to establish joint working spaces that mitigate its losses, due to its lack of presence within the official frameworks of the Syrian opposition.
• Operation Peace Spring clearly impacted the SDF’s political behavior, as it opened up more to Russia and the regime. The operation also significantly favored the “right-wing current” within the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is linked to the Workers’ Party (PKK), over the “reformist current,” which had sought closer relations with the West. Russia’s active entry into eastern Syria after 2019 gave the administration a new political card for negotiation. However, it also forced it to make political and security concessions, while maintaining a margin of political maneuver in its relations with Russia and Western countries.
• In addition to the structural gaps and obstacles within the SDF; Its project, in general, is linked to the future directions of the Syrian file. If the center’s control over the peripheries is strengthened, the administration will attempt to extract minor gains from the regime and its supporters. While the option of revitalizing the Syrian file presents an opportunity for it to present itself as a new partner, it will not gain regional or local acceptance. The scenario is likely to remain stagnant, and thus the administration’s efforts to establish a de facto decentralization will continue.
Introduction
Since 2013, the “Autonomous Administration” of Northeastern Syria has controlled a vast area of Syrian geography, connecting it to large population groups characterized by ethnic, religious, and social diversity. Given its direct influence on the dynamics of local governance, which takes a “federal” form, this study attempts to understand the reality of this administration and explore its future directions. This is done through the political performance of this administration, represented by the “Syrian Democratic Council” and the “Syrian Democratic Forces,” and to identify the factors contributing to its continuity or failure, given the shifting international interests in Syria in general and the northeastern region in particular. The problem of this study is to deconstruct and analyze the statements and political performance of the “Autonomous Administration,” and to demonstrate the extent of their consistency with the administration’s declared vision, which is “a political umbrella reflecting the management of its diversity.” It also attempts to impose a political project as an “alternative model” to the current political system. This is achieved by measuring indicators of political performance effectiveness through monitoring data, analyzing official statements, and understanding the compass of meetings and events. This enables the formulation of an approach that leads to an understanding of this indicator’s reality and future scenarios. This study follows a case study approach. In its first chapter, it devotes a detailed discussion to the legal determinants regulating political life, demonstrating the extent of the Autonomous Administration’s control (of which the Democratic Union Party constitutes the main backbone) over shaping these determinants and their general frameworks, whether in the proposed social contract or through the political parties law announced by the administration. The second chapter reviews the characteristics of party life in the “Autonomous Administration,” qualitatively measuring the political freedoms index within it, considering this a practical application of the above legal determinants, thereby identifying the gaps between theory and practice. The third chapter attempts to clarify the mechanisms and institutions of political decision-making, its most prominent figures, and the factors influencing it, while also understanding the tools used by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to control these decisions. The fourth chapter explains the administration’s political philosophy and vision through several criteria, such as Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue, its stance toward and negotiation with the regime, and its stance toward local and external actors. The political performance indicators of the Autonomous Administration during the period following the 2019 ceasefire were examined through several key determinants: official statements, press releases by Autonomous Administration leaders, and diplomatic activity, both in relations with international and local powers. This was initiated by Operation Peace Spring, which marked a turning point in the new shifts it brought about in the balance of power in eastern Syria, effectively introducing new forces into eastern Syria.
In the final chapter, the study attempts to outline the potential future directions of this administration, given the political stagnation and geographic entrenchment that has plagued the Syrian scene since the undeclared ceasefire in 2020.
A Social Contract and a Legal Framework: Formal Requirements
The establishment of the “Autonomous Administration” dates back to August 13, 2013, when the Democratic Union Party (PYD) announced, during a press conference in Qamishli attended by PYD co-chair Asya Abdullah, the completion of the first phase of the Autonomous Administration project. Executive bodies were also launched in various areas under the party’s control. In early 2014, the first local government was announced in the Jazira Canton, composed of a number of ministers belonging to various political and social groups (1). At the end of 2023, a new social contract was announced, through which the name of the “Autonomous Administration” was changed to the “Democratic Autonomous Administration of Northeastern Syria” (2). With the launch of military operations against ISIS and the support of the international coalition for the “People’s Protection Units,” the military wing of the “Democratic Union Party,” the launch of a military alliance called the “Syrian Democratic Forces/SDF” was announced on October 11, 2015. This alliance included, in addition to the People’s Protection Units, Arab tribal forces, such as the “Sanadid” affiliated with the Shammar tribe (3), the Syriac “Sotoro” forces (4), and other battalions. On December 10, 2015, the formation of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) was announced, the political wing of the SDF. This completed three pillars of the new project: an executive body, the Autonomous Administration; military forces, the SDF; and a political representative, the SDC. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) cadres constitute the primary actors in all three bodies.
The Autonomous Administration worked to impose its administrative, security, social, military, and political influence in northeastern Syria. It formed the Asayish internal security forces to maintain security, divided the districts, established legislative governing bodies, and launched the canton and commune system to ensure access to all villages and neighborhoods. A joint executive presidency and executive bodies in the form of ministries were also activated, such as the Foreign Relations Authority, the Defense and Self-Protection Authority, the Interior Authority, the Justice Authority, the Education Authority, and the Agriculture Authority. The “Autonomous Administration” needs legal rules and regulations to govern the relationship of its institutions with the society it governs. To this end, it issued a social contract and a law regulating party life.
The Social Contract
The “Autonomous Administration” worked to give constitutional legitimacy to its authority, which it imposed on northeastern Syria and Afrin as a de facto reality, by announcing a social contract document. The Democratic Union Party announced that the Jazira Canton Council had ratified the Social Contract Charter for the Democratic Autonomous Administration on January 6, 2014. This constituted a constitutional declaration comprising a preamble and nine chapters, followed by the issuance of four additional appendices (5). The articles of the Social Contract addressed definitions of authority, legislative institutions, and the pluralistic system. They then outlined the structure of the “Democratic Autonomous Administration,” which includes legislative councils, People’s Protection Units (YPG), executive and judicial bodies, and the Supreme Constitutional Court. It also addressed freedoms, rights, and duties, freedom of the media, and the formation of political parties. It also provided an explanation of the Executive Council, the Judicial Council, the High Elections Commission, the Supreme Constitutional Court, and educational curricula.
Four annexes were issued to the Social Contract. The first, issued in 2014, included amendments to the structure of the Judicial Council of the Jazira Canton. The second, issued in 2014, amended Article 54 to require that “the governor be jointly elected by both genders.” The third annex, issued in 2016, amended some articles related to the organizational structure of the Executive Council of the Jazira Canton. The final annex, issued in 2018, amended Articles 55 and 58 of the Social Contract related to the joint governance of the Jazira region. On December 12, 2023, the “Autonomous Administration” issued the amended version of the social contract, which included a preamble and four chapters. The most prominent amendments were changing the name of the “Autonomous Administration” to the “Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria,” changing the name of the “General Council” to the “Peoples’ Council of North and East Syria,” emphasizing the adoption of the “community environmental democratic system,” while continuing the principle of joint presidencies, and indicating that the administration is part of the “Democratic” Syrian Republic. The contract also included changes to the structure of municipalities in all regions, transforming the municipal authority into a municipal assembly and union, and approved the creation of a monitoring institution and a university council, establishing a central payments office, and a court to protect the social contract, which is considered a constitutional court (6).
Regardless of the conceptual fallacies surrounding the proposed social contract, it is considered the supreme law/constitution. Accordingly, the study will attempt to trace the criteria for credibility and enforceability through four main pillars: the legitimacy of this contract, the tools for its production, its philosophy, and the requirements for its implementation.
With regard to the legitimacy pillar, despite the SDF’s attempt to present this contract as the source of its constitutional legitimacy, the absence of indicators of political representation and societal acceptance renders the contract a de facto rule of law, through which it aims to legitimize its emergent existence, which it has seized by force and conquest, without any regard for the mechanisms of consensus and representation, whether societal consensus or representative elections (7).
As for the second pillar, represented by the tools for producing this contract, despite providing a formal framework that indicates discussions that preceded the production of this contract; However, it witnessed a lack of coordination and dialogue with the most important local political actors in northeastern Syria, which makes it a contract from the perspective of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The facts indicate that the committee is composed of representatives of parties and civil society organizations affiliated with the PYD or parties loyal to it, while the actual representatives of civil society organizations and other political parties in the region are absent. Regarding the philosophical pillar, the texts of this contract emphasize the content of the philosophy of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as outlined by Abdullah Ocalan. This proves that it reflects a partisan political culture, rather than a cultural framework for the region with all its components and diversity. The contract emphasized the principle of the “democratic nation,” a primary intellectual approach for the cadres of the PYD and the Democratic Union Party to control all state institutions, impose these ideas by force on society, and transform them into an official ideology. The legal content of the articles of this contract also indicates political references that are not agreed upon within and outside the areas under the administration’s control. These include the consolidation of the idea of federalism in general, and in accordance with the concept of “self-administration” for federalism in particular, through the use of the name “North and East Syria Region,” in addition to the reference to adopting a special flag and anthem, special military forces, and legislative councils. The texts of this contract also constitute a clear circumvention of the political process and the legal documents regulating it, such as UN Resolution 2254, which created a constitutional committee under UN supervision, tasked with writing a new Syrian constitution. Finally, regarding the pillar of feasibility, in addition to the absence of mechanisms for forming and appointing its officials, which is a significant indicator of the party’s control over these tools, and thus the concentration of power in the party’s hands, the absence of an institutional structure, independent oversight, and an independent judiciary are indicators of the inability to transform the provisions of this contract into reality. All the insinuations and references to diversity, pluralism, and democracy will remain formal formulas, as long as the tools for managing diversity, managing differences, and distributing power among the components of this political umbrella remain absent. Local approaches confirm that the cadres of the “Democratic Union Party and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party” impose what they want by force on all institutions, legislative, and political councils (8). Problems have also emerged regarding the appointment of leaders of the “Autonomous Administration,” governors of regions and districts, and formations of civil councils, due to their appointment without direct elections and without qualification requirements, but rather according to the extent of their closeness and loyalty to the “Democratic Union Party” (9).
