Introduction
With the announcement of the formation of the new Syrian government, which is set to lead the transitional phase over the next five years, Syria, both as a state and a people, stands at a critical crossroads. This critical juncture is linked to the performance of the transitional government and the political mindset shaping its strategies at all levels. The ruling class and its representatives today bear a historic responsibility in dealing with major challenges that will shape the country’s future for years, perhaps decades. Foremost among these are political challenges, with their internal and external issues, which intertwine with most other challenges (economic, security, and social), if not shape their essence, define their tools, and chart their ultimate direction.
The new transitional government faces major political challenges, including those related to the internal situation with all its complexities and local contexts, linked to the heavy legacy of the former regime and a long history of political isolation and the exploitation of the state apparatus to protect power. This has resulted in a distorted relationship between the state and society with its various components. Against a high ceiling of domestic political expectations, particularly from the revolutionary crowd, which links this ceiling to the enormous cost it has incurred over the past 14 years, in addition to the expectations of change awaited by all social and political groups and components, the new government faces complex obstacles, foremost among them building internal political legitimacy for the existing authority. This will only be achieved by completing and overcoming sensitive national obligations, restructuring state institutions, revitalizing the economy, and preserving unity, security, and stability.
On another level, there is no doubt that the positive regional and international engagement with the new Syria has prevented it from becoming an arena for proxy conflict, similar to what happened in Libya, for example. Although the flexibility of the new administration and the nature of its responsiveness to internal and external demands have enhanced the chances of this positive engagement, foreign policy still poses questions and challenges no less serious than the internal situation, especially amid an unstable and evolving regional security system, and against the expectations and demands of international and regional powers with conflicting interests, some of which are still directly active on the ground and in the Syrian skies. In this context, the question of what international and regional powers want from the new Syrian government comes before the question of what the Syrian government itself wants, especially given the divergent and conflicting demands and interests of these powers, most of which are linked to two important issues that influence each other: the first concerns Syria’s geopolitical role in the region, and the second concerns the nature of the new leadership that has come to power, represented by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the accompanying concerns and cautious expectations of change.
Syria Regionally: After Iranian Influence
Syria faces a fundamental challenge: redefining its geopolitical role and repositioning itself within the emerging regional political-security order, which is witnessing the decline of Iranian influence and the decline of the tools of the associated “resistance axis.” This intersects with the containment and targeting of sub-state actors/”militias” in the region (Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen), in contrast to regional and international attempts to fill the resulting vacuum, or even exploit the circumstances to impose a new security-political reality by force, similar to Israeli policy in the region in general and Syria in particular.
Amid these complexities, the Syrian government faces the challenge of redrawing its new regional and international alliances in a way that achieves greater legitimacy and political-security stability, ensures the ability to confront greater challenges in the future, and achieves effective and sustainable integration into the regional and international system, while preserving the independence of Syrian decision-making. However, establishing this equation does not appear easy, whether it relates to the region and surrounding countries with their various interests, or to other international powers with conflicting goals and interests in Syria. In between, the new Syrian policy appears to be proceeding with relatively steady steps toward the Arab world, and with cautious steps toward Moscow and Beijing, in favor of moving closer to the Western-NATO axis (the United States, Europe, and Turkey). While these political steps appear to be an attempt to strike a balance in managing foreign relations and responding to the demands and interests of various powers, without making major concessions or engaging in a clear alliance, they also represent a risky bet in a sensitive context, with fragile and incomplete alliances and a newly formed authority.
Regarding relations with Turkey, managing them in a balanced manner is of paramount importance at this stage. Ankara has clear interests in preventing the establishment of an independent entity in northeastern Syria and in securing its borders. It also aspires to a major economic and political role in and through Syria. In contrast, the Damascus government views some Turkish objectives as a shared interest in preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and stability. It recognizes that it needs Turkey as a regional backer and strategic ally amid security and military threats in the region. This is without overlooking the concerns of some Arab countries regarding the nature and scope of this alliance. Despite the intersection of the interests of the Arab powers with Turkey’s strategic interests in Syria, most notably curbing Iranian influence and controlling Israeli intervention, some Arab countries still have concerns about Ankara’s potential influence on Syrian decision-making and the expansion of its influence in the region through Syria. However, Ankara’s keenness to overcome the legacy of troubled relations with the Arab axis over the past decade has contributed to making Arab-Turkish relations within the current regional context appear less tense and more coordinated than they appeared during the Arab Spring (when the Syrian issue was managed competitively). Today, however, the level of coordination between the two sides appears greater, reflected since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in the form of a Turkish-Arab diplomatic momentum. The most prominent outcome was a five-way summit held by Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria at the foreign, defense, and intelligence levels in early March. The summit focused on the importance of cooperation, particularly on the security front to combat terrorism, a move that Washington appears to view positively.
On the other hand, concern over Turkey’s role is growing in Israel’s national security imagination, which views it as a complex threat, both in terms of establishing new military bases in Syria and an alliance with the new Damascus government, and the potential for increased Arab-Turkish cooperation in Syria. In this context, Israel appears to prefer Moscow’s continued presence in Syria as a counterweight to the powers it controls (unlike the Europeans, who are seeking to achieve several interests, most notably limiting Russian influence to the maximum extent possible) and ensuring that Syria remains a theater for conflicting interests that prevent the emergence of a strong central government.
Therefore, the Israeli threat today represents one of the most prominent complex challenges facing the new Syrian government and its foreign policy, particularly given the presence of the far-right Netanyahu government, which views Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham from a perspective similar to that of Hamas, regardless of the differences between them. In this context, Israel fears a repetition of the October 7 scenario on its northeastern border. Israel also views Syria’s geography as a vital area for it, at a time when it seeks to impose regional hegemony based on its military-technological superiority. This is not to mention Netanyahu’s efforts to exploit Syria and export it as a new threat in an attempt to escape the consequences of the Gaza war and its repercussions on his political future.
In this context, Israeli violations, which have recorded nearly 700 airstrikes over four months, have transformed into a comprehensive policy that includes ground incursions, control of strategic points, attempts at social and intelligence penetration, and the violation of airspace. This is based on a bet on the current government’s failure in the short and medium term, which will result in a greater chance of chaos, maintaining various areas of influence, preventing the formation of a strong central government, and rehabilitating the Syrian army’s capabilities on its borders. It may also increase pressure in the future to ensure the reformulation of political-strategic agreements in its favor, in a manner consistent with the paths of Arab normalization over the past years. This will have no less serious internal repercussions than its external ones.
Syria Internationally: Intertwined Interests and Conditional Opportunities
The data clearly indicate that the opportunities to curb Israel’s expansionist policy lie primarily with the Trump administration and secondarily with the European Union. This is similar to the efforts to consolidate international legitimacy and lift sanctions, which represent one of the most significant challenges in the short and medium term, particularly given their connection to the interests and demands of both sides (European and American) and the Syrian administration’s level of flexibility and responsiveness to them. While the United States has achieved most of its declared interests after reducing Iranian influence and eliminating ISIS, ensuring these interests and others on a sustainable basis represents the primary goal of the new US administration, which considers Syria pivotal within the framework of a broader strategy in the region to “combat terrorism” and ensure the security of its allies, especially Israel, especially in the event of its withdrawal from Syria, and ensuring that the vacuum is filled in a manner that does not destabilize the region.
Despite the positive signals from the US position toward the change taking place in Syria, from Operation Deterrence to the present day (pressure on the Iraqi side to prevent the entry of Popular Mobilization Forces, intelligence cooperation on the ISIS file, the smooth transition of the “New Syrian Army” bloc operating in al-Tanf to the new Ministry of Defense, and pushing the SDF to negotiate, etc.), Washington continues to impose several conditions and requirements on its recognition of the new Syrian government, ranging from the structure of the existing authority, its composition and orientations, to its regional and international positioning. In this context, it also encourages the formation of a regional cooperation mechanism between neighboring countries, with the goal of combating terrorism (Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria), in preparation for filling the vacuum resulting from the potential withdrawal of its forces and ensuring that Syria does not once again become a hub for extremist groups that threaten regional and international security.
As for the European demands: Some of these interests revolve around the American orbit, while others diverge from it, particularly with regard to ending the Russian presence in Syria. Washington does not appear enthusiastic about ending Russian influence in the manner demanded by Europe, especially given Israel’s efforts to maintain this influence as a regional counterweight. On the other hand, the priorities of most European countries in Syria intersect around the refugee issue and the fight against terrorism, while others relate to Syria’s geopolitical role in the region, including the demarcation of its maritime borders in the Mediterranean, where Turkish interests also emerge. In this context, France sponsored a virtual meeting bringing together the heads of state of France, Greece, Cyprus, and Syria. This was preceded by another meeting to demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese border, which concluded with the signing of an agreement under Saudi auspices.
Conversely, despite the openness of most European countries, led by France and Germany, to the new Syrian authorities—whether in the initial context of exchanging information and combating terrorism, or through their positive-cautious political engagement, such as reopening embassies, strengthening communication and diplomatic representation, and welcoming the formation of the new government— However, it still links the continuation of this openness, the completion of the lifting of sanctions, and genuine engagement in reconstruction to clear and tangible changes in the form and policies of the new government. This poses additional challenges for the new administration, seriously testing its ability to engage with Western concerns and interests and its approach to the national interest, without making concessions that could affect its internal cohesion.
On the other hand, Moscow’s room for maneuver appears narrower, having lost its most important allies and tools in Syria. It is cautiously awaiting the final results of its negotiations with the West, led by the United States under Trump, regarding its war in Ukraine, the form of a potential settlement, and its implications for Russia’s position and alliances in the international and regional order. At the same time, Moscow is attempting, within the framework of preserving its strategic interests, to balance its relationship with the new Syrian administration and open up clear margins for maneuver with the West, particularly the Europeans. This is what the Syrian administration is aware of, and it is seeking to exploit these margins and open new ones, such as restoring relations with China. It realizes that these margins can be used for economic and political developmental initiatives that contribute to enhancing stability and creating room for maneuver in negotiations with the West, rather than being drawn into polarization between international and regional axes, which poses risks in these sensitive circumstances.
In the face of these intertwined interests, the most prominent challenge facing the Syrian transitional administration is to transform and advance Syria from a theater for conflicting regional and international interests into an arena for building consensus and converging interests. This is achieved through a precise understanding of the map of various interests and their approach to national priorities, starting from clear strategic alliances that contribute to ensuring stability and national security, and avoiding the foreign policy game of balancing between axes. The latter approach appears to be a dangerous bet in a sensitive situation with fragile, incomplete alliances and a newly formed authority.
