Executive Summary
In light of the complex equation currently governing the Syrian file, questions of security stability in Syria emerge as one of the most important and possible foundations for both early recovery and the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. Accordingly, this report attempts to encompass the estimated figures indicating security stability by highlighting four critical indicators at the level of individual and societal security, considering that the individual and society are the pillars of any policy that seeks progress and recovery. The four security indicators examined in this report are: assassinations, bombings, arrests, and kidnappings, adopting a “qualitative modeling methodology.”
By tracking the assassination and bombing indicators in the governorates of Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, and Daraa during the period under study, 380 operations were recorded, divided between 308 bombings and 72 assassinations. The tools used to carry out these operations varied, including shooting in 213 operations, explosive devices in 94 operations, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in 39 operations, landmines in 25 operations, and hand grenades in 9 operations, in addition to other types of tools. The total number of victims reached 1,008, distributed between 490 military personnel and 518 civilians. The selected models in this report, which included Daraa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah, revealed a clear failure of the regime, on the one hand, and the autonomous administration, on the other hand. The numbers of bombings and assassinations were high due to the security chaos experienced in these governorates, as a result of the multiplicity of actors, their distribution between local, foreign, and militias, and their conflicting and divergent agendas. This negatively impacted the safe return index. Both assassination and bombing indicators in the Syrian opposition-controlled areas during the period under study show a total of 266 incidents, resulting in 1,209 casualties (890 civilians versus 319 soldiers). In addition, 93 incidents involved improvised explosive devices (IEDs), while 69 incidents involved the use of car bombs. Data analysis from the Euphrates Shield and Afrin regions indicates the activity of the Wrath of Olives operations room, which has taken the lead in claiming responsibility for assassinations in these two areas. Furthermore, a high rate of arrests and kidnappings was recorded in these areas. Overall, these figures indicate the failure of security agencies to protect their local environments from infiltration and their inability to deal with the renewed targeting methods and means employed by those carrying out assassinations. Given the fragile security situation in these areas and the ongoing operations of the Wrath of Olives operations room, any talk of a safe return of refugees to these areas is questionable for those intending to return. By tracking the arrest and kidnapping indicators in the cities of Jassem, Duma, Albukamal, and Raqqa during the period of preparing this report, statistics show that 73 operations took place in these cities, as follows: Jassem: 15, Duma: 20, Albukamal: 20, Raqqa: 18. In addition, 23 operations were carried out by foreign actors, targeting 182 people, and 19 operations carried out by local actors, killing 117 people. Meanwhile, 31 operations of unknown origin remained, targeting 89 people. The number of victims of these operations reached 388, distributed among 188 civilians, 109 from reconciliation parties, 56 soldiers, 12 from the People’s Protection Forces, 20 from the Local Defense, 2 from the Autonomous Administration, and one member of the Military Security Branch. The above results demonstrate a high degree of deterioration in the security stability index, particularly in light of the multiplicity of perpetrators, ranging from official and international entities to local militias. This is not to mention the operations that remained anonymous, which confirms the instability of the return index amid the deterioration of protection factors, the multiplicity of authorities, and the incompetence of security actors. Regarding the arrest and kidnapping indicators in both Afrin and Jarabulus, the number reached 169 incidents, distributed between 37 incidents in Jarabulus and 132 in Afrin, resulting in 355 victims. The Wrath of Olives Operations Room claimed responsibility for 17 of these operations. All of these operations targeted members of the National Army, luring them for interrogation and then liquidating them. According to the monitored data, the largest proportion of operations occurred in January 2020. The perpetrators of 141 arrests were identified, while the perpetrators of 28 operations remained unknown. The disparity in recorded numbers, which is largely attributed to the city of Afrin, indicates the failure of security actors to confront the perpetrators of these operations and the weakness of security governance measures. This in turn exacerbates unrest and security concerns, given the multiplicity of security authorities and multiple grounds for arrest.
The report recommends a series of policies, most notably: encouraging decision-makers in countries hosting Syrian refugees to avoid lenient return policies. The data, as the report demonstrates, confirms the deterioration of the safe return index. Consequently, the governments of these countries must establish a set of legal, administrative, and political conditions that ensure a safe environment and enforce them on the regime.
Introduction
The relationship between security stability and early recovery is organic in post-conflict countries, and reciprocal in cases of political transition and transformation. However, the constant in the equation for achieving security and stability is the necessity of a new political climate that dries up the sources and causes of conflict. The Syrian situation is no exception in this regard. On the one hand, the issue of security stability has become a national concern, but at the same time, the reasons driving the chaos and fragmentation of authorities, whether local, regional, or international, have multiplied. On the other hand, the impasse that has plagued the political process and the accompanying diversion of its essence (from a political transition to a constitutional committee with unclear paths and outcomes), obscures any anticipated breakthrough that would transition the country to a new political climate in the foreseeable future. Consequently, stability indicators remain at negative values.
As the Syrian situation moves toward a “deep freeze” scenario, increasing the likelihood of a hardening of the security borders separating Syria’s three areas of influence: (the Turkish-controlled area and its Syrian opposition ally northwest of the Euphrates; the American-controlled area and its ally, the Autonomous Administration northeast of the Euphrates; and the Russian-Iranian-controlled area and their ally, the regime). Security stability rates will be linked to early recovery and social stability, whether for residents of their areas inside Syria, those displaced from other regions, or refugees abroad who hope for a dignified and safe return to their homes. This is the focus of this report, which attempts to monitor and analyze four critical indicators at the individual and societal security levels: assassinations, bombings, arrests, and kidnappings. This is done through a selected sample of cities representing the various Syrian geographies.
In order to arrive at accurate estimates, models were chosen that could provide a generalizable picture to the rest of the regions with acceptable skepticism. Accordingly, the report, in its first and second sections, tracked the indicators of bombings and assassinations over a full year, beginning in early July 2019 and ending in late June 2020, in the three areas under its control. In the areas controlled by the Syrian regime, regime-controlled areas in Deir ez-Zor and Daraa governorates were selected, as they were areas the regime had regained control over, and where security issues were the most pressing.
In the areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration, the areas controlled by the regime in Deir ez-Zor were selected, along with Hasakah governorate, a vital center for the regime. As for the areas controlled by the Syrian opposition, all these areas in the governorates of Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, and Hasakah were tracked.
To measure these two indicators, a special model was designed to monitor these operations and analyze their data as indicators of safe return. The model for assassinations and bombings included the following: (date, location, type of incident, target, targeting tool, target description, and perpetrator). The results of these operations and their outcomes were also noted. The report also sought to analyze this data and cross-reference it across different regions, in an attempt to outline the general features of the security situation and provide a preliminary measure of indicators of stability and safe return.
The report relied on the following sources:
Social media handles of activists in the monitoring areas or those following security operations.
Official handles and websites of local agencies and media outlets covering events in those governorates.
The third and fourth indicators included arrests and kidnappings, two crucial indicators, given their importance as determinants of the safe return of refugees and displaced persons alike. Three examples were selected from regime-controlled areas: cities that have been under control since 2018: Jassem in Daraa, Douma in the Damascus countryside, and Albukamal in the Deir ez-Zor countryside. As for opposition areas, Jarabulus was selected because it was captured approximately two years ago as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. It is therefore an objective test of its security stability indicators. The city of Afrin was also chosen for its sensitivity, on the one hand, due to its recent control (since early 2018), and because it provides preliminary data that allows the report to compare it with the first model and determine whether it matches or differs from it.
