ISIS in Syria after “Empowerment”… An Approach: Activity Bearers, Structural Features, and Employment Levels

Executive Summary
The activity of ISIS cells in Syria after 2019 raises several questions, particularly given their continued ability to launch attacks despite ongoing counter-terrorism campaigns and the targeting of their leadership. The nature and frequency of these attacks vary depending on the region and the forces controlling them. Some attacks have taken on an ambiguous character, with some attributed to the organization without official claim of responsibility. The name “ISIS” has also become a leverage and a political-security investment in the Syrian conflict.
The first phase of the study involved drawing a sample of 179 operations officially claimed by the organization over a 15-month period. The data from these operations and their local contexts were analyzed according to time period, geographic area, target group, and execution patterns. A sample of ambiguous operations attributed to the organization without official claim of responsibility was also tracked and analyzed. The second phase was based on the hypothesis that the organization’s limited internal capabilities during the current phase are not commensurate with the continuity of its activity and the increase in its operations in some areas. Therefore, there must be additional factors that support this activity beyond the inherent capabilities. In this context, the study examines a set of variables, primarily the nature and levels of security control and the various management/governance models depending on the controlling forces.
The form of security models, their level of centralization, and the nature of their interests affect the organization’s ability to operate within various areas of control. Security gaps often create opportunities for its cells to operate, not to mention the fact that various parties resort to employing some of the organization’s cells and elements in security, directly or indirectly, for various purposes and interests.
The shortcomings and failures of the governance model and the compounding effects it generates contribute to pushing many local residents into the weakest and most vulnerable areas, not to mention increasing the level of popular discontent. This has given, and will continue to give, the organization and other ideological groups an additional opportunity to increase their activity, mobilize and attract, and ensure the continuity of resources. All parties in control carried out security campaigns against ISIS cells and sites. Their levels varied according to their respective capabilities and security interests. Their implementation ranged from joint to individual, and from intermittent to intensive. Although the various campaigns shared the slogan of fighting ISIS, their objectives varied under this banner, particularly as military actors sought to target their local opponents under the pretext of “the organization.” Field conditions and the organization’s internal capabilities during this phase were reflected in changes to its structure. It now relied on decentralized activity, with local elements as its primary driving force. Ideology was no longer the sole driving force, especially given the diverse backgrounds of the elements it relied on, the widening security breach within its ranks, and the financial need that prompted it to develop alternative sources of funding.